2. Arguments against the Opinion

32. Against this conclusion [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations and not by something absolute] there is argument in four ways: first by comparing relation to the related thing, second by comparing relation to its origin, third from the proper idea of the constitutive thing itself, and fourth by authorities.

33. [First way] - As regard the first the argument is as follows:

Something is related formally by relation (as someone is made white by whiteness), but the relation itself is not related (because according to blessed Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2, “every relative is something when the relation is removed;” and: “If the Father,” he says, “does not exist to himself he will not be anything that is related;” for the relation is not related, because that which is related by a relation is not a something afterwards nor is it simultaneous in nature, - therefore it exists naturally prior); but the essence is not really related, therefore the supposit alone is related; therefore the supposit is really and naturally there prior to the relation. Therefore a divine supposit is not constituted or distinguished first by relation.

34. Proof of the assumptions: everything composite of necessity pre-requires parts and the union of the parts, and this is so not only in a composite that is per se one but in a composite that is per accidens one; for just as the essence of man pre-exists the essence of body and soul and their union, so the essence of a white man pre-requires the being of man and whiteness and their union. Therefore the being of some related thing, which is said ‘to be related first’ as a quasi-whole, pre-requires relation as the form, and that which is related by the relation as the subject, and their union. Therefore something is first in-formed by relation before it is something relative as a composite, and this is said ‘to be related first’: that prior thing, in-formed by the relation, can be said to be related, because everything in-formed by some form can be said to be of the sort the form is.a

a [Interpolation]     Therefore nothing in divine reality can be said to be related unless there is something that is said to be denominatively related as it were; and it will not be constituted formally by the relation as per se included in it (the point is clear from the difference between the first related thing and that to which it is said to be denominatively related), and this can only be the supposit (this was shown before [n33]); therefore , etc     .

35. This reason is confirmed by a likeness, because just as man would not first be animated unless he were per se an animated body (being in-formed, as it were, by the soul), so will it be - as it seems - in the question at issue, because nothing that is not first constituted formally in ‘being’ by the relation will be first a related thing unless something is first related as it were denominatively on account of denomination from the relation.a

a [Interpolation ] In accord with this one can argue - but less effectively - as follows: if the relation is not related neither is the divine essence (as is plain); therefore only a person is related. But what is related exists in itself first. Proof: according to Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3a, “if the Father is not something in himself he will not be anything that might be said in relation to another.” - Next by reason, because what is related is not simultaneous in nature with the relation, because nothing is simultaneous in nature with the relation save the relation; therefore that which is related would be relation, and so relation would be related. Nor is it posterior in nature to the relation, because what is ‘of such sort’ by a quality is not posterior to the quality (likewise of quantity and other forms); therefore similarly in the case of relation. Therefore some third member must be granted, namely that that which is related is prior to the relation, and then the consequence seems to follow that it is something absolute, because nothing save the absolute seems to be prior to relation.

36. Again a real relation pre-requires a real distinction between the extremes, therefore no relation is first to cause the real distinction between the extremes; therefore not in the present case either. - Proof of the antecedent: the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.9.1018a2-4, about ‘the same’, proves that identity is not a real relation, because it does not pre-require a real distinction between the extremes.

37. If it be said that a relation is not real which neither pre-requires nor makes a real distinction between the extremes, - on the contrary: then this argument is not valid, ‘the extremes are not really distinct, therefore the relation is not real’. For either what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, and then the consequence ‘therefore the relation is not real’ does not hold, because so could it be taken in the question at issue; or what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction made by the relation, - if you thus take ‘therefore a distinction between the extremes is not made thereby [sc. by a distinction made by the relation], because it is not a real relation’, then to argue from the antecedent so taken that the relation is not real is to argue ‘because it is not real, therefore it is not real’, which is empty.a

a [Interpolation] It can be said in another way that the major [sc. the above antecedent] is true of an accidental relation that is added to extremes already distinct; the relation here is not of this sort, but is a relation that constitutes a supposit that is made formally distinct by the relation. - Against this: to a relation ‘whereby it is a relation’ there belongs that it be toward another, because if it is not toward another it is not a relation (otherwise one could even say that paternity could be a real relation in abstraction from the Son, if there was no need in any way for the extremes of the relation to be distinct, as there is no such need in the case of identity). For either ‘this paternity’ is toward something else distinct from mere filiation or it is toward something distinct by a distinction prior to the distinction that would come to it from the Son. If the second holds then the proposed conclusion is obtained [sc. that the persons are not constituted by relation]. If the first holds then to argue ‘paternity is not toward something distinct, therefore it is not real’ is to argue thus: ‘to this relation there is no real relation opposed, therefore it is not a real relation’; but this seems to be a manifest begging of the question, because the antecedent does not seem to be more manifest than the consequent. Therefore in the case of many relations no argument may be constructed to conclude that they are not real on the ground that these relations are not between really distinct extremes, but there would in all cases be a begging of the question.

     Again, third, as follows: every relation has its term first in something absolute; but the first term of the relation ‘in a person’ is some other person and not the essence, because just as the essence is not related so it is not the term of a relation (for thus the term of the relation is distinguished as the related thing is); therefore a person, insofar as it is distinct from another person and is the term of the relation of that person to itself, is absolute. The major will be made clear in distinction 30 [nn.35-38], in the question ‘On the Relation of God to Creatures’.

38. [Second way] - In the second way the argument is as follows:a

A relation cannot be originated save by something absolute previously originated, whether in the related thing or in the term;b     therefore the divine person that is first originated cannot be merely a subsistent relation, but one must posit something absolute that is originated first.

a [Interpolation] first from the order that origination necessarily pre-requires, which order seems to be twofold, - for the first originating thing is prior to the originated thing; a relative is in no way prior to its correlative, because these are simply simultaneous; therefore etc     . - There is also a confirmation of this reason from the opposite, as it were, of the conclusion, as follows: if the persons are not absolute but are relatives first [then follows n.40]

b [Interpolation] just as neither can motion be in a ‘[relation] toward another’ save only per accidens, because it is per se toward an absolute in the subject or in the term of the relation, as is plain from Physics 5.2.225b11-13.

39. This reason is also very much confirmed if one denies that the essence is the formal term of this production; for then neither will the originated thing exist toward itself nor will it be the formal term of the origination, - which seems to be unacceptable.

40. Again,a it will then be the case that for the Father to originate the Son is no other than for the Father to have the Son as correlative; but the Father of himself - by the fact he is Father - has the Son as correlative, because in no instant whether of origin or of nature can the Father be understood without the Son or without being understood to have the Son; therefore the Father of himself, without origination, has the Son, therefore he does not originate the Son if nothing is originated save the correlative.b

a [Interpolation] from the priority of the originator to the originated: the originator is prior to the originated; a relative is in no way prior to the correlative, because they are simply simultaneous. -And each reason is confirmed by the fact that it follows from the opposite of the conclusion: if the persons are not absolute but relatives first.

b [Interpolation] This is more clearly argued as follows: that thing is not originated which possesses - when the being unable to be begotten is posited and all action is abstracted - its whole being; such is the correlative of what is unable to be begotten, because from the nature alone of the relation, as it is first act (with every action or second act removed), the correlative of what is unable to be begotten exists when the unable to be begotten exists;     therefore etc     .

41. Further, third: every relative equally naturally has regard to its correlative, therefore the inspiriter as equally regards the inspirited as the generator the generated. Therefore if what is produced by each production is merely relative, each is equally naturally produced, and so there will not in divine reality be a double production (by way of nature and by way of will), and then it can be said that the Son is produced by way of will and the Holy Spirit by way of nature as equally truly as the opposite, - which is against what everyone says.

42. Again, then no production in divine reality will be generation, because generation is to primary substance [n.60] as to the produced term; but here relation or the relative is posited as the first thing produced; therefore there will be production in the category of relation and there will not be generation.

43. Again,a a supposit is in some way pre-understood for action, because each thing is first understood to exist per se before understood to act per se; if in that prior understanding the supposit is for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. the persons are not constituted merely by relations]; if the supposit is not for itself but toward another - as toward the Son - then the Son is understood at the same time, and so the Son is pre-understood to generation, and so the Son will not be the term of generation.

a [Interpolation] from the second priority the argument is, second, as follows: [alternative text] from the priority of originator to origin.

44. And there is a confirmation, because by whatever priority one correlative is pre-understood for something, by that same priority the latter correlative is preunderstood for it, because the of the simultaneity of relatives.a

a [Interpolation] One can argue in accord with this about the third priority, namely of relation to person, which is proved by the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-7: for form is prior to the composite (according to him there), so paternity is prior to the first person and consequently the opposite relation will be prior to the first person; therefore this relation is not obtained by the first person through the action of the first person. The consequence about the opposite relation is proved through the simultaneity of relatives.

45. [Third way] - As to the third way [n.32] the argument is as follows: Whatever constitutes existence in something, and in the unity corresponding to such existence, is wholly first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitutes man in his being and specific unity, rational is wholly first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, when removing if possible or per impossibile everything other than rational that is not part of the meaning of rational and keeping only the meaning of rational, a division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And the proof of this proposition is that if such a distinction is repugnant to the constituted whole, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that something be a; if it is wholly repugnant to the a itself then the intended conclusion is gained, - if not but it is repugnant to the a itself through b, there will be a process ad infinitum or, wherever a stand is made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such a unity and a distinction opposed to such unity will be wholly repugnant to it. Therefore if paternity constitutes the first supposit in its personal being under the idea of its being incommunicable, then communicability must of its own idea be first repugnant to paternity.

46. But this seems false for many reasons:

First because, according to those who hold this opinion [n.15], quiddity is not of itself incommunicable; therefore neither is paternity.

47. Second because paternity is not of itself a ‘this’, when everything that is not of the formal idea of paternity has been removed; for when deity is removed, which is not of the formal idea of paternity (according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3, ‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’), paternity is not of itself formally infinite, and consequently neither is it of itself a ‘this’ - and if so,a then neither will it much more be of itself incommunicable, because incommunicability presupposes singularity.

a [Interpolation] Proof of this consequence: what contains by identity something that is outside its primary idea is in some way unlimited; therefore what formally contains such a thing is simply infinite (for formal containing requires a greater perfection in the container). From this further: if paternity is not of itself a this...

48. Next, third, because any divine relation of origin is equally the same as the divine essence; therefore if it contracts from it some incommunicability, any relation would contract it equally; but this is false, because active inspiriting, although it is a ‘this’, is yet not incommunicable, for it is in two things, namely the Father and the Son.

49. And from this result is proved, fourth, that since opposite relatives seem to be uniformly related to incommunicability, and since active inspiriting is not of itself thus incommunicable, then neither is passive inspiriting, which is the opposite of active inspiriting, incommunicable; therefore neither will passive inspiriting thus constitute the Holy Spirit in his personal being, which is false.

50. Next, fifth, because even if certain positions are set down, impossible or incompossible when the understanding of ‘rational’ is in place, it would be repugnant for it to be divided into several specific natures; for example if it were set down that ‘rational’ were the difference of color and that the color could produce substances from nothing, or any suchlike things. But once this impossible position is set down, that the production of the will is prior to that of the intellect, then, when preserving the ideas of generation and inspiriting, active inspiriting would be in one supposit and active generation would then be in two, because there would be communicated to the Holy Spirit - in the instant in which he is inspirited - generative force; therefore now communicability is not formally repugnant to active generation in itself.a

a [Interpolation] To this argument about ‘the first incommunicable’ there is a twofold response:

     In the first way that paternity, although it is not incommunicable ‘whereby it is paternity’, yet divine paternity or paternity ‘whereby it is divine’ is incommunicable.

     In a second way: that subsistent paternity (of which sort paternity is in God) is incommunicable, but not inherent paternity, of which sort is created paternity.

     Against the first response, although the three final proofs [nn.48-50] are conclusive, yet I argue otherwise in two ways:

     First as follows: when two things ‘per se’ constitute a third, neither of them has from the other the condition that is proper to it insofar as it constitutes the third, but each has such condition from itself first. For example, about matter and form: matter does not have from form the potentiality that is its in causing the composite, nor does form have from matter the actuality that is its in compounding; thus too in the case of definition: the genus does not have from the difference a determinable concept, nor does difference have from genus a specific individual act indivisible into several specifically different things. Therefore if a person is constituted from essence and an incommunicable property, neither of these will have from the other what is proper to it; as follows, just as essence does not have communicability from the property but is of itself communicable, after one removes in thought the property, so the property will not have incommunicability from the essence, but will be first such of itself, when the essence is per impossibile removed.

     Further, essence does not give incommunicability to the Father as it is merely essence, because essence is communicable; therefore as itself it is understood to have paternity virtually in itself, and so the same thing ‘as virtually in the essence’ will be the reason for itself ‘as formally such’, - which is unacceptable: first because I ask about it as it is virtually in the essence whether it is communicable or incommunicable; if it is communicable, it will not be the reason for incommunicability in paternity as it is formally in itself, - if it is incommunicable and from the essence (according to this response), the counter argument will again be, as before, that it is not from the essence as it is merely essence, and so the question ‘either it is communicable or incommunicable’ will be raised ad infinitum; second because no unity more truly or intensely belongs to anything as it exists merely virtually than belongs to it as it exists formally, and this when speaking of unity proper to it, and the point is plain as about entity proper; third because what is in another is in it by way of it - therefore what is in the essence virtually, as it is precisely in it, does not exist there as incommunicable.

     Against that which is replied afterwards about subsistent relation, that it is incommunicable, I ask: since something must be understood to be a ‘this’ before it is subsistent, I ask by what is paternity a ‘this’? Not of itself, since it is not formally infinite - therefore much more is it not subsistent of itself either; therefore neither is it of itself incommunicable.

51. Again, an argument as to this way [n.32] is made, second, principally as follows: from the ultimate constitutive and distinctive elements of certain things there cannot be abstracted something common that is predicated in the ‘what’ of these things; proof: because if there is something common to them, they are not first distinguished by that common thing, but they are distinguished by something that contracts them, and so they are not the first distinctive elements; if then they are first distinctives, nothing predicated in the ‘what’ is common to them. But from paternity and filiation is abstracted that which relation is, and this seems to be something common to them and univocal; for the intellect can be certain about relation and doubtful about this relation and that. Therefore the things from which relation is abstracted are not first distinctives.a

a [Interpolation] Response is made by denying the minor [sc. relation as common to paternity and filiation and univocal], by saying that the divine relations are first diverse. - Against this an argument has frequently been made [n.51], and one middle term can be repeated: because then he who knows one origination in divine reality and does not know whether that origination is generation or inspiriting, would have no concept save about the verbal sound. Vain then would those problems be that are raised about generation or about production in general, and they are solved by their proper middle terms before asking about productions in particular.

52. Again, third: the first constitutive element of a supposit in any nature seems to make something that is per se one with that nature, because it does not seem that the per accidens could be ‘first simply’ in any genus, according to the Philosopher Physics 2.1.192b20-23;a but just as in creatures relation is of a different kind from the absolute and so does not make something per se one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept per se of the absolute and of relation; therefore if person includes these two things, namely essence and relation, essentially, then person does not seem to be a supposit per se and first of such a nature but is a supposit as it were per accidens, and so it seems that some prior thing could exist that is constitutive per se of the supposit in that nature.

a [Interpolation] There is confirmation for the reason: the first identity seems to be of the first nature with its proper supposit, therefore that identity is not per accidens nor quasi per accidens but is altogether per se; therefore the supposit does not include anything of a quasi other genus than the nature.

     There is also confirmation in that otherwise the identity of a created substance with its supposit would be more ‘per se’ than the identity of the divine nature with its, which seems unacceptable.

     There is a third confirmation in that secondary substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of primary substance, - therefore in primary substance there is no concurrence of another quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance; for if primary substance includes per se a quiddity distinct from secondary substance, then it is not more a ‘per se supposit’ of the secondary substance than of that other quiddity, and so not more of neither or of them or of both.

     Nor is the response valid here that this quiddity is that one by identity, and therefore the same ‘per se one thing’ can be the per se supposit of each quiddity. - For this does not save the ‘per se unity’ of the supposit, because a supposit is set down as a ‘per se supposit’ of a quiddity by actuality, according to formal idea, but not because of a real and non-formal identity of itself with some other quiddity (for then a per se supposit of being would be a per se supposit of unity because of the true identity of ‘one’ with being). Therefore a supposit ‘per se one’ is only a per se supposit of a quiddity formally one, and consequently of no quiddity formally distinct from it, -and consequently it includes per se in the first mode no formally distinct quiddity, because there is no reason why it should not be a per se supposit of that distinct quiddity if it were to include it per se in the first mode.

     If an objection be made here about the [divine] attributes, the case is not similar, because no attribute constitutes per se a supposit of deity, but it is a passion (according to Damascence chs. 4, 9), and it is not unacceptable for a quasi-passion to be quasi per accidens the same as a quasisubject (and even as the supposit of the subject), although it is unacceptable for the first supposit of the first subject to be in itself a being per accidens.

     To the third reason, that proceeds from the per se unity of a supposit of divine nature [n.52], the response is made that relation constitutes as it passes over into the essence and so is not as if it is of another genus; nor does it follow because of this that the thing constituted is absolute, because relation preserves that which is proper to itself, - though it is well conceded that that which is left behind through relation is absolute, because the ‘left behind’ is existence.

     Against this response. I ask: either relation constitutes as it is the same as the essence formally (or quidditatively), - and if so, two absurdities follow: one that relation will not be relation, because according to Augustine On the Trinity VII “if it exists to another then it is not substance”, and by parity of reasoning, if it is formally substance then it does not exist to another; likewise another absurdity: whatever is constituted by something insofar as it is formally absolute is formally absolute, and so a constituted supposit would be formally absolute. Or, supposit is constituted by relation insofar as relation passes over into or is the same as the essence not formally but really, - and with this stands the fact that it is constituted properly by relation as it is relation, because relation can in no way be considered in divine reality without being really the same as the essence. If therefore, when considered in some way, it were to constitute a supposit per accidens, given that it might constitute in this way - and yet it is, in any way considered, the same really though not formally as the essence - the consequence is that, from the fact that it constitutes as the same really as the essence, nothing prevents what is constituted from being an entity per accidens; but it cannot constitute as more the same with the essence than really, because it does not do so as formally the same.

     Further, as to the remark that ‘relation leaves behind absolute existence’, this would seem to be repugnant with itself, because a form does not leave behind an existence other than itself, just as whiteness does not leave behind in the white thing any other existence than itself by which the thing is white;     therefore a constituting property, if it preserves that which is proper to itself, leaves behind that which is proper to itself and nothing else. Likewise, how could absolute being be left behind by a relative property if it preceded it in the person?

53. [Fourth way] - In the fourth way the argument is from authorities:

Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: “Every relative is something when the relative is removed etc     .” Therefore, as was deduced by the first reason [n.33], he seems to concede that that which is related is something in itself.

54. Again, ibid. ch.4 nn.8-9: “Every being subsists for itself, how much more God?” And he speaks of ‘subsist’ which pertains to substance in the way the Greeks take substance; but they (according to him) take substance the way we take person; therefore the ‘subsist’ which belongs to a person insofar as it is person, which is counted up in the three (namely the way we speak of ‘three subsistents’), that ‘subsist’ exists for itself, according to him, and it is unacceptable for a divine person to subsist toward another when taking ‘subsist’ in this way.

55. Again, third: all the things put in the definition of person, whether by Boethius De Persona ch.3 or by Richard of St. Victor On the Trinity IV ch.22, are absolute, such that none of them includes relation essentially; and a definition ought to express the intrinsic quiddity of the defined thing, -     therefore etc     .a

a [Interpolation] To the authorities of Augustine already adduced (here in the fourth way) response is made that Augustine is speaking of that which is formally signified by the name ‘person’, not of that which is materially signified; but formally this name ‘person’ signifies something in intellectual nature that is indistinct in itself and distinct from something else; but that by which such distinction exists is an accident of that which is formally signified - yet it is necessary that in some nature that distinct thing is absolute (as in the created nature) and that in some nature it is a relation (as in the issue at hand, namely divine reality).

     Against this response. Either Augustine understands the ‘indistinct in itself and distinct from something else’ in that which is formally signified by person in accord with essence, and then he no more has to concede that there are three persons than that there are three essences (or three things distinct according to essence), which seems manifestly contrary to his intention, when he means that we use the name of substance otherwise than as the Greeks do; so they use it for primary substance and concede that there are three substances in the way that we concede that there are three persons; therefore we properly concede - according to him - three persons. Or he understands ‘indistinct in itself’ according to incommunicable substance (and so ‘distinct from something else’), and then if that - in accord with that which is formally signified - exists for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. person is something absolute not relational].